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1 Introduction
In reviewing the history of twentieth century
famines, Devereux (2000: 4) notes that until
recently, most English definitions characterised
famine as ‘a discrete event that is triggered by food
shortage and results in mass death by starvation.’
As several authors have demonstrated (cf. de Waal
1989; Edkins 2000), this understanding of famine
evolved out of a particular set of intellectual
circumstances and reflected the pervasive influence
of the views of Thomas Malthus. In 1798, Malthus
argued that since populations grew at a faster rate
than their food supplies, there would necessarily be
times when the food needs of a population
exceeded its resources. In such cases, famine would
act as a natural ‘check’ on population levels
(Malthus 1976).
In the 1980s however, a series of landmark studies
challenged some of the assumptions underlying the
Malthusian view.1 In Poverty and Famines (1981),
Amartya Sen elaborated an alternative approach to
famine that described food crises as failures of
‘entitlements’. In so doing, he shifted the analysis
from an exclusive focus on food shortages to an
emphasis on people’s inability to access food,
whether or not a shortage was a contributing factor.
In a series of articles critiquing Sen’s approach,
Rangasami (1985) went further and argued that
famine should be viewed as a process with distinct
phases, rather than an isolated, aberrant event. In
another seminal work, Famine that Kills (1989),
Alex de Waal contested the definitional association
between famine and mass death by starvation.
While these studies challenged Western
conceptualisations of famine, there was an increasing
recognition of the role of conflict in newly
emerging crises in the 1990s, and a perception that
the very nature of famine had changed, from
essentially ‘natural’ to predominantly ‘political’
phenomena.2 A number of studies of the newly
identified ‘complex political emergencies’ (CPEs),
emphasised the socio-political dimensions of
famine (cf. Duffield 1994; Keen 1994),
demonstrating how some groups actually garnered
benefits from the creation and perpetuation of
famine conditions. But as the focus of analysis
shifted from nature-induced famines to multi-
dimensional crises involving conflict, there was
little critical reflection on whether these
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phenomena – with such different evolutions and
causalities – were even comparable. Most authors
(cf. de Waal 1997; Duffield 1994; Edkins 1996;
Macrae and Zwi 1994) tacitly subsumed
discussions of complex emergencies into the
famine discourse, rather than questioning the
relevance and applicability of the concept of famine
to the context of complex emergencies.
As we move into a new decade, there is increasing
awareness of the global dynamics of famine and the
greater variety of situations to which the term may
be applied (cf. Introduction to this Bulletin). In this
collection alone, at least four articles – on Malawi,
Iraq, Ethiopia and Madagascar – examine food crises
that blur the boundaries of what constitutes a
‘famine’. Yet currently, there is no agreed definition
or set of conceptual parameters on which to base
judgements. As we widen our consideration to
include the views of non-academic stakeholders, the
differences in perspectives become even more
pronounced (see Box 1). Although some academic
insights have permeated into the policy discourse
(note, for instance, the similarities between Walker’s
and WFP’s ‘working definition’), by and large there
has been a tendency for academic definitions to
become more complex and encompassing, while
those of other stakeholders have remained more
‘reductionist’ and practical (e.g. the journalist in Box
1) or personal (e.g. the aid worker) in their focus.
Given the rapid shifts in thinking about these crises
over the last few decades of the twentieth century
and the lack of consensus on a definition, this
article asks some fundamental questions about our
understanding of ‘famine’. Drawing on research
conducted in East Africa, it explores: how we
determine when a famine starts and ends; how
many people must be affected, and to what degree,
in a given area for a crisis to qualify as a famine;
and to what extent a crisis can involve sectors other
than food and still be labelled a ‘famine’.
2 The temporal question: when
does a famine start and end?
The literature offers two seemingly contradictory
perspectives on this question, which are associated
with those who view famines as ‘events’ and
‘processes’, respectively. (As will be seen, this
representation of two distinct positions is a bit
misleading, but it serves as a useful way to frame the
discussion, at least at the outset.) Those who view
famines as time-bound ‘events’ tend to believe that
they begin, as the journalist in Box 1 suggests, when
people become emaciated from starvation. This
perspective reflects the pragmatic constraints facing
journalists, donors, and emergency aid workers, who
must prioritise their interest in crises by clear
evidence of suffering. They may recognise that
famine is the result of longer-term processes, but
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Box 1: Some definitions and perceptions of famine
l ‘Famine is a socio-economic process which causes the accelerated destitution of the most
vulnerable, marginal and least powerful groups in a community, to a point where they can no
longer, as a group, maintain a sustainable livelihood. Ultimately, the process leads to the inability of
the individual to acquire sufficient food to sustain life’ (Academic and practitioner, who studied the
East African famines of the 1980s (Walker 1989: 6)).
l ‘If we see stick people, it’s a famine. Otherwise, [it’s] hunger’ (Journalist, Nairobi Bureau, who
covered the crises in Sudan in 1998 and Ethiopia in 2000).
l ‘When there was no cok, you used to play, sometimes to go for dancing, or to visit friends. But in
cok, all that is limited’ (14-year-old boy, who experienced the crisis in southern Sudan in 1998).
l ‘It is a horrible thing. You [the affected person] just feel helpless. You don’t have energy to do
anything’ (Aid worker, who worked in southern Sudan in 1998).
l ‘Famine is a process over time whereby harmful social, economic, environmental and political
factors (normally in combination) lead to a population increasingly physiologically vulnerable to
any single or series of negative events’ (WFP, Regional Office for East Africa).
l ‘The F-word’: a punning epithet used in some East African aid agencies to convey the dread of the
political implications associated with the use of the term.
their interest cannot be fully engaged until a crisis of
mass starvation is imminent or occurring. (As one
interviewee said: ‘One way you know it is a famine is
when the journalists from Spanish TV show up.’) The
public, as a result, also perceives famine as an event
that emerges almost without warning in horrific
images on front-pages and television screens. While
emaciation is the rough visual gauge of the start of the
event, nutrition and excess mortality data are
considered more objective indicators. Although some
organisations such as the World Food Programme
(WFP) have cut-off points for implementing feeding
programmes (WFP 2000), there are no widely
accepted criteria of what rates of malnutrition or
mortality indicate that a famine has begun.3
In Poverty and Famines (1981), Sen argued, in a
slightly more sophisticated formulation of the same
view, that a person ‘can be plunged into starvation’
by a collapse of entitlements (Sen 1981: 47). This
phrasing, and the assumptions that underlie it, were
criticised by other academics, because it seemed to
imply that famines were exogenous events that
suddenly befell a population. Such a representation,
it was argued, de-contextualised the crisis,
removing it from the social and political processes
that generated it (cf. Devereux 2001; Edkins 1996).
On the other hand, there was a growing consensus
among researchers over the course of the 1980s that
famines were more appropriately viewed as linear
processes that progress in distinct phases, rather
than sudden unforeseeable events (Walker 1989).
Rangasami (1985) maintained that it was possible
to distinguish ‘three distinct periods’ in a famine:
dearth, famishment, and starvation. Other
researchers (cf. Corbett 1988) tried to detail and
sequence the specific coping strategies employed by
affected populations at various stages in the crisis.
From this perspective, a famine is not the outcome
of a process, but rather is the process itself. Thus,
even in the early stages, before any starvation has
occurred, a crisis could qualify as a famine. 
Many aid agencies and information systems adopt a
‘hybrid’ view, combining both the process and event
perspectives. Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), for
instance, explicitly conceptualises food insecurity as
a linear process with discrete stages that culminates
in famine, health crisis, and death (Oxfam 2001).
Many early warning systems, such as USAID-funded
FEWSNET, are premised on the assumption that
there is a process that can be monitored to signal the
approach of a famine. But whether an agency takes
the ‘purist’ view that famine is the process, or a more
‘hybrid’ perspective that it is the result of a process,4
these approaches suffer from important problems. 
In practice, they do not adequately account for the
uncertainties inherent in the evolution of famines.
Most of the famine process research focused on
rather predictable slow-onset, drought-induced
crises. It was assumed that, in the absence of outside
intervention, the process would inevitably lead to
mass mortality. But famines do not evolve according
to a single identifiable scenario and may involve a
complex mix of conflict and natural shocks. 
In a village that experienced the 1998 famine in
southern Sudan, shocks occurred at various points
during the evolution of the crisis and were both
‘positive’ and/or ‘negative’ in effect (see Box 2).
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Box 2: Shocks during the evolution of famine in a village in southern Sudan
l The raids of pro-government militias (PDFs) began in the mid-1980s and continued through 1998.
l The raids by Kerubino’s forces took place over a period of years in the 1990s (1994–7).
l A particularly bad raid displaced almost all the villagers from their homes (1997).
l Peace between Kerubino’s militia and the largest rebel movement caused the sudden return of the
displaced to their home area without adequate provisions in early 1998.
l The aid intervention in 1998 was a ‘positive shock’ that nevertheless had some negative
consequences, as it congregated groups in unsanitary conditions around Ajiep.
l The rains in July 1998 increased deaths, in part due to exposure.
l October floods, after the peak of the famine, washed out a feeding centre and exacerbated the poor
sanitation conditions.
Examining this list, even in retrospect, it is hard to
choose an appropriate starting point for the famine
process (the PDF raids? Kerubino’s raids? the
peace? the aid? the rains?), if one adopts the purist’s
perspective. It is equally difficult to apply
meaningfully the phases of dearth, famishment,
and starvation, or to use MSF’s stages of food
insecurity, food crisis, and famine, if one adopts a
‘hybrid’ view. Overall, the process was more
complex and heterogeneous than presented in the
models, with the circumstances of individuals and
households improving and deteriorating in an
unpredictable manner. At the time of the crisis, it
must have been even more difficult to make
accurate prognostications about whether this was a
process leading inevitably to mass mortality. 
This variability undermines any attempts to
identify clear starting and ending points for the
crisis. The resulting ambiguity causes confusion
among people who are sincerely trying to
understand what is occurring. It also creates the
space for actors to achieve their own interests, by
moving forward or delaying the declaration of
famine. A persistent fear of people involved in early
warning is that they will be accused of ‘crying wolf,’
i.e., making unfounded alarmist claims about the
imminence and severity of a crisis. This concern
reflects the uncertainties of making forecasts as
well as the suspicions surrounding the motivations
of various actors.
In southern Sudan in late 1997, several agencies
warned of a potential crisis (though with varying
conviction and with differing assessments of the
likely magnitude). Well into 1998, however, there
were serious divisions among various donors, aid
agencies, and journalists about whether the crisis
they were witnessing was in fact a famine.
Representatives based in Nairobi tended to view
the situation as more serious than did their
counterparts located in Khartoum. There was
suspicion that those working in the south were
overly sympathetic with the rebels, while
conversely some thought that the northern sector
was too deferential to the Government of Sudan. As
a result of these divisions, as well as the confusion
surrounding the use of the term, the UN did not
declare the situation a ‘famine’ until 11 June 1998
(BBC 1998), which was after the peak of mortality
in April (Deng 1999).
3 The scale question: how many
people must be affected, and to
what degree, within a given area
for a crisis to be a famine?
Unpacking this question requires addressing three
elements, which are often confused and conflated in
discussions of scale: absolute numbers, severity, and
geographic spread. In popular Western
conceptions, famine has been associated with what
Sen called ‘a particularly virulent manifestation of
[starvation] causing widespread death’ (Sen 1981:
40). While the number of deaths were not precisely
quantified, there was a presumption that they
would be on a massive scale. To many academics,
this emphasis on large-scale mortality is an
outdated view, closely allied with an understanding
of famines as time-bound events. But it is an
understanding that is entrenched in Western
thinking and continues to be a source of contention.
Box 3 offers two different interpretations of whether
the most recent (1999–2000) food crisis in
Ethiopia, where it is estimated that at least 10,000
people died (IDS 2002), constituted a famine.
On the surface, the position of the WFP
spokesperson appears somewhat puzzling, even
inhumane. She seems to be implying that the
deaths of several thousand people, with all their
attendant suffering, are not significant enough to
qualify as a famine, and to be justifying her
position on the apparently trivial grounds of not
‘debasing the coinage’. Yet, her view is informed by
a rational logic. WFP is well aware of the emotive
nature of the term and the expectations associated
with its use in the West, and is worried about
applying it lightly. There is clearly a difference in
scale between the Ethiopian famine of 1983–5,
where it is estimated that between 590,000 and 1
million people died (Devereux 2000), and the
crisis that occurred in 1999–2000.5 Practitioners
working in southern Sudan expressed similar
concerns about ‘cheapening’ the term, by
expanding its use to a wide variety of situations.
Meanwhile, the statement by the epidemiologists,
supported with estimates and confidence intervals,
highlights another dimension of the problem with
absolute numbers: in practice, it is very hard to
establish accurate figures for mortality. In this case,
the team conducted a survey in one district, and
22
extrapolated their findings to the surrounding zone,
thereby arriving at a figure of 19,500 deaths. (Further
extrapolation produced an upper limit of 98,000
deaths for the five affected zones.) While this was an
experienced and highly qualified team, and their
methodology is carefully documented in the article,
the precision of the figures and the scientific language
tend to disguise the uncertainty surrounding the
numbers from the lay person. These retrospective
uncertainties point to the even greater difficulties of
establishing how many people have died or are
expected to die while the crisis is in progress. 
The premise underlying this discussion of absolute
numbers is that famine implies deaths. However,
there are some who argue that no-one has to die in
order for a famine to have occurred. In Famine that
Kills, de Waal (1989) points out that, in local
conceptions in Darfur, Sudan, different severities of
famine are recognised, and ‘famine that kills’ is
only one of these. Other types cause hunger and
destitution, as well as social breakdown. De Waal is
fully aware that this usage does not conform to our
preconceptions of the meaning of famine, and that
his approach is open to the criticism that it risks
‘cheapening’ the term.6
But de Waal argues for an expansion and deepening
of meaning on several grounds. Most significantly, he
points out that this usage is more consistent with the
experiences of famine-affected populations, who
currently ‘live (and die) under an alien definition’
(1989: 30). Unfortunately, at this point the argument
becomes murkier and harder to follow, because
there are some translation difficulties. He indicates
that the Arabic word ju means ‘hunger’; maja’a
involves ‘hunger’ as well as ‘destitution and social
breakdown’; and maja’a al gatala includes ‘hunger’,
‘destitution and social breakdown’ and ‘death’. The
implication seems to be that the same word maja’a is
involved in some way with all these concepts (since
ju and maja’a share the same root), and that English
should likewise use ‘famine’ for all equivalent levels
of food crises. Yet, he also indicates in a parenthetical
remark that he has and will continue to translate
maja’a ‘loosely as ‘famine’, though it is better
translated as ‘famine and/or dearth’ (de Waal 1989:
77).
The translation difficulties seem to confuse two
separate points. First, and most convincingly, he is
suggesting that the words for food crises in Darfur
have ‘richer’ connotations than their equivalent
terms in English. The Western emphasis on the
extremities of malnutrition and death fails to capture
the central features of the experiences, which revolve
around destitution and social breakdown. Second,
and less convincingly, he seems to be suggesting that
‘famine’ should be applied to all the different
categories of food crises. This second point does not
follow from the first. It is possible to enrich our
notion of ‘famine’ to emphasise destitution and
social breakdown, and still reserve it for the
equivalent of food crises that cause deaths (e.g.
maja’a al gatala, in Darfur). Other terms such as
‘dearth’ could also acquire greater connotations and
be applied to less severe crises (e.g. maja’a).
Elsewhere, he argues that if we restricted ‘the use of
the word “famine” to events that involved mass
starvation unto death [we] would effectively reduce
the number of famines in the modern world to very
few, if any’ (de Waal 1989: 24), but this seems to be
changing the terms of the debate. I am not sure that
I have fairly represented de Waal’s argument, but my
confusion over the translations may be suggestive of
the difficulties facing its wider acceptance.7
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Box 3: Scale issues – Ethiopia, 1999–2000
A WFP spokesperson: ‘Our position has been in WFP that this was a very serious food crisis and because
of the response, didn’t slide over into famine. ...Our feeling is we should save that term [‘famine’] for
those very, very severe, severe situations. Otherwise, we are debasing the coinage’ (IDS 2002).
A team of epidemiologists: ‘We estimate that approximately 19,900 (95 per cent CI, 14,500–25,000)
excess deaths occurred across the Gode zone. ...A prolonged and severe famine occurred in Gode
district and the surrounding area from December 1999 or earlier and continued at least until July 2000.’
(Salama et al. 2001: 568–9).
Most academic writers do not discuss how large a
geographic area must be affected by a crisis in order
for it to qualify as a famine. Yet for practitioners, lay
people, and those affected, it can be an integral part
of their assessment of the scale of the crisis. The East
African regional office of the World Food
Programme, faced with the dilemma of how to label
the 1998 crisis in Sudan, at one point came up with
the phrase ‘pockets of famine’ to convey the sense
that the most severe areas of hunger were
geographically isolated from each other and to
distinguish that situation from the ‘normal’
conception of famine, in which starvation conditions
are more widespread. At a more local level, one of
my interpreters in southern Sudan, in trying to
clarify to an interviewee that we were discussing the
most serious type of crisis, pointed to each of the
nearby houses in turn, declaiming: ‘there is no food
in that house, or that house, or that house.’
4 The sectoral question: to what
extent can a crisis involve sectors
other than food and still be called
a famine?
Much of the academic and grey literature on famine
starts from the theoretical premise that famines, in
their onset and evolution, are food crises that
necessitate trade-offs between consumption and
the preservation of essential assets (cf. Corbett
1988; Walker 1989). By narrowing its focus in this
way, the literature (with some important
exceptions) consistently filters out certain aspects
of the affected population’s experiences. These
include the ways that they deal with requirements
for water, health, shelter and physical security
during the crisis, as well as the role of emotions,
culture and religion in their perceptions of and
responses to the famine.
This academic approach has helped to shape the
policy discourse as well. In the Oxfam Handbook of
Development and Relief (Eade and Williams 1995),
the section on survival strategies during food crises
describes only those related to food and income.
Likewise, Save the Children (UK)’s Household
Economy Approach (formerly the Food Economy
Approach), which is based upon Sen’s entitlement
approach, currently makes little allowance for
water, security, or health needs in its assessments.
This perspective also pervades the policy discourse
in a subtler way. In describing the experiences and
needs of the affected populations, the reports of
non-governmental organisations (NGOs) take a
largely dispassionate approach. The World Food
Programme’s 1997 Annual Needs Assessment for
southern Sudan (which made forecasts about
conditions in 1998) begins in the following
manner:
In 1998, emergency food interventions will
continue to be required where the accumulated
effects of long-term insecurity and heightened
current insecurity have eroded normal coping
mechanisms and where displaced populations
impose additional burdens on already hard-
pressed food economies (WFP 1997:1).
This rather dry, professional tone is employed
throughout the report. In addition to narrowly
focusing on food (which, in fairness, was the brief of
the assessment), the report, in its phraseology, strips
the emotional, spiritual, and (much of the) cultural
content from the presentation of the experience. In
part, this approach reflects a deliberate attempt to
avoid sensationalising the crisis. It may be believed
that in dealing with an issue as potentially highly-
charged as famine, it is important to ground
decisions in a rational evaluation of the available
data, and not to be swayed by emotional arguments.
It may also represent a conscious decision to keep
the analytical framework simple and focused in
order to achieve clearer results. Whatever the
legitimate rationale for this framing of the discourse,
a side-effect has been to ignore large portions of the
experience of food crises and famines.
For instance, many people trace the origins of the
1998 famine in Ajiep, southern Sudan to the
attacks of Kerubino Bol, a former rebel commander
who switched sides to the government and
conducted a series of raids among his own people
(Dinka Rek) in Gogrial county starting in 1994.
Here is how one man described his experiences (in
translation):
Kerubino’s forces came at night when people
were sleeping. ...When I heard the noise and
people crying, I felt trembling fear. ...They shot
my elder brother in the leg and he died. They
called ‘Come out.’ When he did, they said ‘You
just take off your clothes.’ And they shot him. I
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ran with two goats and the children escaped. My
mother stayed with the dead body. I came back
and buried the body and took my mother away.
Even in this short account, one senses the fear,
sorrow, and trauma experienced during a raid.
A wider survey of the ways people dealt with food
crises in three southern Sudanese communities
presented some surprising results (see Table 1). In
one village, Bur Rab, where there was a severe
drought in 1997, many people reduced food
consumption in order to avoid using water in
cooking during the dry season. In another village,
Akac, some parents kept up the morale of their
children by reminding them that the UN would
bring assistance. As the chief in another location,
Pathian, said: ‘If you are told you will be given food
after five days, you will not die.’ (Although these
are anecdotes, they suggest that the psychological
impact of aid – both positive and negative – should
be more closely studied.)
But as other sectors are incorporated into discussions
of famine, it can become difficult to distinguish
between different types of crises. The drought that
led to the crop failure in Bur Rab also caused the
wells to dry up four months earlier than usual
(September instead of January), forcing people at one
point to ration water at the expense of food
consumption. Was the famine in that area a food
crisis, or a water crisis, or both? In the raid near Ajiep
described in the passage above, Kerubino’s forces not
only chased the household from their land, but also
burned down their tokuls, or huts, and looted their
grain and livestock, forcing them to search for food
elsewhere. Was the displaced household facing a
security crisis, a shelter crisis, or a food crisis?
There has been considerable debate in the famine
literature about whether deaths caused by epidemics
(as opposed to starvation) in overcrowded,
unsanitary refugee camps should be classified as
famine mortality. Many nutritionists argue that these
deaths are famine-related, because malnutrition
lowers biological resistance and increases the
person’s susceptibility to communicable disease
(Young and Jaspars 1995). De Waal (1989), by
contrast, had suggested that in Darfur, 1985, almost
all deaths were caused by epidemics, independent of
levels of food consumption. Others have pointed out
however, that exposure to epidemics in refugee
camps resulted from hunger-related migration.
Mediating this debate, Devereux (2001: 252) has
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Table 1: Some coping strategies used in southern Sudan in 1997/98
Village Water strategies Health strategies Psychological strategies Physical security 
strategies
Bur Rab  Reduced food  Stopped working  Prayed more frequently No data
consumption to avoid to care for the sick  Contributed livestock 
using water in cooking  Sold livestock or or money to ‘evil-makers’
 Bathed less frequently other assets for medicine
Akac No data  Adopted UN hygiene  Received visit from chief  Buried grain to 
promotion strategies  Reminded households hide it from 
 Contributed livestock that UN was providing militias
or money to witchdoctor assistance  Moved cattle to 
another village
 Migrated
Pathian  Drank flood waters  Took over duties of  Attended church No data
 Built dyke around sick member  Prayed more frequently
homestead  Prepared traditional  Sang inspirational songs
remedies
written: ‘Famine mortality reflects both increased
susceptibility and increased exposure to diseases...but
both reflect a common origin in disrupted access to
food (epidemics that are not triggered by food
scarcity are not, definitionally speaking, famines).’
But as we have seen, it is extremely hard, in practice,
to disentangle the various sectors in a famine and to
say unambiguously that a crisis originated solely ‘in
disrupted access to food’.
While there are dangers to broadening our
conceptions of famine, it is also problematic to
maintain the simple association between famine
and food. The worry is that a declaration of famine
will generate a response that reflects this almost
unconscious assumption, rather than a holistic
assessment of the evolving requirements in a given
situation. In addition, there is a concern that the
link between famine and food legitimises the
interests of actors who want to privilege food aid
(because it is their area of expertise or is easily
mobilised). The emphasis on ‘food first’ may be at
the expense of relevant non-food items, with
potentially severe consequences. In Ajiep (the
‘epicentre’ of the famine), mortality increased 4-
fold in the nine days after the start of rains in July,
due in part, according to observers, to exposure. A
senior aid worker recalled becoming frustrated
with ‘the singular focus on food...as something
defining the crisis’ and complained that ‘people
[were] dying in the rain’ from lack of shelter.
5 Conclusion
While people in various parts of the world
continue to experience ‘all manners of suffering’,8  it
remains uncertain what the most appropriate
designation for those experiences (in English)
should be. This article has attempted to
problematise some of our assumptions about the
integrity of the concept of ‘famine’, by highlighting
its temporal, scale and sectoral ambiguities. These
ambiguities have consistently undermined
attempts to achieve consensus on a definition, have
led to confusion over policies, and have been
exploited to achieve non-humanitarian ends.
Many people, including the present author, are
currently engaged in attempts to devise an
operational definition of famine that reconciles
these ambiguities (cf. Howe and Devereux 2002).
But there is a danger that, in our haste to supply
answers, we will fail to listen to the questions: if
famines do not have consistently identifiable
phases, how should the temporal bounds of the
crises be demarcated? If famines are not associated
with a threshold level of mortality (or hunger), how
do we know that a famine is occurring? If famines
are seen to involve issues such as water, health,
physical security, emotions, and religion, what
makes them fundamentally distinct from other
forms of humanitarian crises?
Is it meaningful to speak of ‘famine’?
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1. Lipton (2000) points out that Malthus’ view, in
subsequent writings, became more nuanced.
Nevertheless, it is this earlier formulation of his
theory that has dominated the discourse.
2. This is a highly debatable point. Clearly, all famines
are ‘political’ at some level. A more balanced view
might recognise that while there was an upsurge in
conflict-related crises (Masefield et al. 1997), there
was also a heightened awareness of and focus on the
political dimensions of famines in the 1990s.
3. Many organisations use a crude mortality rate ³
1/10,000/day as an indication of an ‘emergency’ but
not necessarily a famine. Medecins Sans Frontieres
(MSF) does have its own internal criteria for
identifying a famine, but these are not yet widely
accepted (Oxfam 2001). 
4. The distinction between the ‘event’ and ‘hybrid’
views is that the hybrid perspective explicitly
incorporates the process into its conceptualisation of
famine, whereas the event perspective only
maintains a cursory awareness of that process. 
5. What is less clear is why WFP should be so reluctant
to apply the term ‘famine’ to a case which, given that
thousands of lives were lost in a short time to
hunger-related causes, is more clear-cut than many
others where the label has been highly controversial
(cf. Devereux on Malawi 2002, in this Bulletin). IDS
(2002) suggests that it was in the interest of agencies,
such as WFP to claim in retrospect that a famine did
not occur, because it allowed them to congratulate
themselves for having averted it. Conversely,
conceding that famine had occurred would have
been tantamount to an admission of failure (see also
Maxwell on Ethiopia, in this Bulletin).
6. In this case, the critique is based on the severity of
the crises to which he wants to apply the term, while
in the previous discussion, the question surrounded
the absolute numbers experiencing a given level of
severity, i.e. death.
7. The author is actually sympathetic to the notion of
applying the term ‘famine’ to crises that do not cause
deaths. If my community in England experienced a
food crisis that forced us to leave our houses and sell
our assets, and that impaired the mental and physical
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development of young children, we would want to use
a term with all the emotive connotations of ‘famine’ in
English, even if it did not result in deaths. (However, if
such crises were a regular feature of our lives, would
we be more stringent with our gradations?)
8. This phrase is taken from de Waal’s Famine that Kills
(1989: 73).
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